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Multilateral means for bilateral ends:
Japan, regionalism, and
China–Japan–US trilateral dynamism
Yun Zhang
Abstract The conventional understanding of Japan’s approach to East Asian re-
gionalism is that of a primacy struggle with China, using both hard and soft bal-
ancing. However, Japan’s strategic priority remains extending and managing the
alliance with the US in the post-Cold War era. The increasing trilateral dynamics
among China, Japan and theUS have largely influenced Japan’s perception of its po-
sition in the alliance, which frames the basic thinking of Japan’s attitudes toward re-
gionalism. Japan’s policy and diplomacy toward regionalism have been subordinate
to alliance management rather than to a strategic policy shift. Meanwhile, Japan’s
perception of its regional influence vis-a`-vis China also affects Japan’s calculation in
regionalism.
Keywords Regionalism; alliance; Japan; China; the United States; trilateral rela-
tions.
Introduction
Japan has a long history of being interested in Asian regionalism. The impe-
rial expansion of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (EACS) with Japan
at its core was introduced coercively in the early 1940s. Between the 1960s
and 1980s, Japan floated several regional economic cooperation proposals.
The former evaporated with the defeat of Japan in the Second World War
(Pyle 2007: 196, 206–207); the latter did not yield substantial achievements
due to the confrontational constraints of the Cold War (Takahara 2003:
65–66). With the end of the Cold War, a more favorable environment for
the development of regionalism emerged in East Asia. Most strikingly, a
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new wave of regionalism, which includes both Northeast Asia and South-
east Asia for the first time, began to gain momentum in the aftermath of
the East Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998. As the only advanced econ-
omy and traditional advocate of regionalism in Asia, Japan should have
taken this opportunity to cultivate its diplomacy toward Asia. The follow-
ing decade, however, witnessed Japan’s fluctuating policies and attitudes to-
ward regionalism. Japan showed its seriousness in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Yet, it ‘approved only stuttering steps forward’ in the decade that
followed (Rozman 2007: 251).
The conventional explanation of Japan’s approach to regionalism is that
Japan is balancing against a rising China in Asia (Soeya 2005a: 223; Ter-
ada 2006: 5–12; Mochizuki 2007: 756–757; Rozman 2007: 258; Hughes 2009:
846–848; Zhang 2002: 46; Yu 2008: 67; Sohn 2010: 497–519). For some advo-
cates of this position, Japan is a ‘passive follower’ (Terada 2006), while for
others it is engaged in a proactive ‘anti-China strategy’ (Soeya 2007: 32) to
‘reshape Asia’ by augmenting its soft power in the region (Sohn 2010: 498).
Other contributions to the debate have even labeled Japan’s regional ef-
forts as a strategic shift to be a more regional-oriented diplomacy (Inoguchi
2002: 7; Sohn 2010: 517).
It is undeniable that China matters greatly in Japan’s calculations in re-
gionalism. But the problem of existing explanations is that they largely ig-
nore the link between major power relations – in particular, trilateral ones
between China, Japan, and the US – and Japan’s thinking toward regional-
ism in the last decade. More specifically, the Sino–Japanese competition in
East Asia is slightly over-emphasized, while the US factor is ignored.
This paper argues that the trilateral dynamics of Chinese, Japanese and
US foreign policies have largely influenced Japan’s attitudes toward region-
alism and that alliance management with the US is the primary and fun-
damental variable in the process for Japan. Japan’s approach toward East
Asian regionalism is largely subordinate to, and even serves as a tool for, the
management of alliance relations with the US. At the same time, this paper
also argues that Japan’s perception toward its regional influence vis-a`-vis
China’s regional presence has its fair share despite as a secondary variable.
In developing the arguments, this paper makes three contributions to the
literature. First, by challenging the conventional wisdom, the paper aims to
provide an alternative explanation of the major determinant of Japan’s pol-
icy of regionalism and to fill the academic gap between regionalism and ma-
jor powers dynamics in Asia. The development of East Asian regionalism
tremendously depends on the policies of two East Asian giants: Japan and
China. Yet, the regional policies of these two countries are fully exposed to
the trilateral dynamics of China, Japan and the US. Interestingly, as China’s
rapid rise fundamentally transformed the balance among these three states
over the past decade, the dynamics of trilateralism have greatly increased
parallel to East Asia regionalism since 1997. Although ample research is
available on each topic, the links between them remain to be explored.
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Second, the empirical analysis will focus on the period of 1997–2009,
when Japan’s policy and diplomacy toward regionalism were closely linked
with trilateral dynamics. Although the ‘triangular analysis of strategic back-
drop’ has been noted in the literature on regionalism (Rozman 2007:
251), comprehensive and detailed empirical studies have yet to emerge
(Takahara 2003; Zhang and Montaperto 1999). The few efforts in this re-
gard are mostly focused on a short period around the late 1990s. By way
of contrast, this paper will examine the critical period of 1997–2009. In the
process, it will provide a more comprehensive picture of Japan’s evolving
strategy toward regionalism.
Third, by linking the analysis of trilateral relations and East Asian re-
gionalism, this paper will also reveal elements of Japan’s grand strategy.
In particular, it will help to answer the long-standing strategic questions of
Japanese statecraft: ‘closer to Asia or to the West’ (Samuels 2007: 2); or a
middle path of ‘synergy between the US–Japan alliance and Asian diplo-
macy’ (Fukuda 2007).
Contextualizing regionalism and trilateralism in Asia
Regionalism remains a vaguely defined term despite its wide use in the lit-
erature of international relations. Many intellectual efforts have sought to
distinguish regionalism and regionalization. Regionalization, which is of-
ten used interchangeably with regional integration, is typically defined as
a process of interdependence or interconnectedness in certain geographic
regions, especially in the economic sphere (Mansfield and Milner 1999: 598;
Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach 2002: 280; Evans 2005: 196; Shaun 2007:
29). Meanwhile, regionalism is more often defined in terms of building re-
gional institutions or even regional identities (Griffiths, O’Callaghan and
Roach 2002: 280; Evans 2005: 196; Shaun 2007: 29). Taga defines regional-
ism in terms of ideology, which brings conscious policy and strategy into a
certain region (Taga 2005: 87). Others try to blur the distinction between
these terms by defining regionalism in terms of regionalization, regional
awareness and identity, regional interstate co-operation, state-promoted re-
gional integration, and regional cohesion (Hurrell 1995: 37–73).
This paper does not focus on clarifying the difference between regional-
ism and regionalization. Given the fact that regional economic integration
can occur without regional institution building, this paper limits the discus-
sion of regionalism to conscious initiatives and commitments of enhancing
regional institutionalization and collective awareness. These initiatives and
commitments are primarily driven by states, although other important play-
ers and forces at a regional scale are involved. With this in mind, this paper
defines Japan’s policies toward East Asian regionalism as the initiatives and
commitments by the Japanese government toward regional institution and
cohesion building. From this definition of regionalism, this paper uses three
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categories of political, economic and ideological integration to track Japan’s
evolving approach toward East Asian regionalism.
The key trilateral relations of Asia are composed of US–Japan relations,
US–China relations, and Japan–China relations, all of which have influ-
enced the ebbs and flows of Japan’s policies toward regionalism. Among
the three sets of relationships, the US–Japan relationship is critical. During
the Cold War, the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ defined the US–Japan alliance as the
core of Japan’s post war diplomacy, which had secured Japan’s relatively
smooth and rapid economic recovery, and its political return to the inter-
national community and regional reconciliation (Samuels 2003: 204–211;
Pemple 2006; Schaller 1982: 392–414; Destler et al. 1976: 10–12; Packard
2010: 92–103). For Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, the key ques-
tion was how to manage the alliance with the US. Like other alliance man-
agement systems, the US–Japan alliance was not free from the ‘alliance
dilemma’, namely the fear of entrapment and the fear of abandonment
(Snyder 1984: 461–495; Snyder 1997: 180–186). For instance, the Sino–US
rapprochement in the early 1970s witnessed the fear of abandonment by
the US in the aftermath of ‘the Nixon Shock’, and Japan’s attitude toward
the Vietnam War reflected its fear of entrapment in US wars. At the time,
Japan was cautiously balancing the two fears in order to maintain the con-
tinuation and effectiveness of the alliance in the context of the Cold War.
Yet, Japan worried more about the nightmare of entrapment than of aban-
donment during the Cold War because the common enemy of the Soviet
Union made abandonment by the US relatively unlikely. The management
of the alliance weighed more on how to decrease the fear of entrapment in
US wars or disputes in which Japan had little interest.
The collapse of the Cold War forced Japan to address new strategic and
security calculations. One leading Japan expert summarized the new pos-
sible threats to Japan as follows: (1) a rising China, (2) a miscreant regime
in North Korea, (3) the possibility of abandonment by the United States,
and (4) the relative decline of the Japanese economy (Samuels 2007: 4). In
this context, Japan had several strategic options to address the new chal-
lenges. The first possible option to be a ‘normal country’ would be to en-
hance Japan’s autonomy and accommodate the above challenges, but, in
doing so, might elevate an internal burden and raise suspicions of neigh-
boring countries. To counter these risks, a second option for Japan would
have been to fully embrace regionalism, but Tokyo did not have full con-
fidence in the effectiveness of its Asian relations. The third option was an
ideal pattern of evenly balancing between the US and Asia but it required
careful diplomatic skills to gain the trust from both sides simultaneously.
The choice of the first or the second option would explicitly mean Japan’s
departure from its alliance with the US. The third option risked inviting US
suspicions toward Japan’s half-heartedness and possibly abandonment by
the US without the guarantee of being accepted by its neighbors in Asia.
After some illusions and experiments in the early 1990s (Funabashi 1997),
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Figure 1 Measuring Japan’s perceptions toward the trilateral relations.
Japan’s strategists decided to maintain its Cold War strategy with the be-
lief of the lowest cost and risk to deal with the post-Cold War challenges.
How to manage the US–Japan alliance remains the core issue for Japan’s
diplomacy even after the Cold War and the only difference is how to man-
age the fear of abandonment, which is also closely connected with its per-
ception of US–China relations. Japan’s policy and diplomacy toward East
Asian regionalism is not free from this basic mentality. Thus, this paper uses
‘the fear of abandonment by the US’ and ‘the fear of US–China nearing at
the expense of Japan’ as the benchmarks in measuring Japan’s perspectives
toward US–Japan and US–China relations correspondingly. At the same
time, Japan’s confidence in its regional presence vis-a`-vis China is another
important benchmark, although it is considered of secondarily relevance
(see Figure 1).
Evading abandonment through showing relevance, 1997–2000
The period between 1997 and 2000 witnessed profound adjustments in
China–Japan–US relations. Japan faced the situation of simultaneously cold
Sino–Japan and US–Japan relations, as well as much closer Sino–US rela-
tions. Japan’s fear of abandonment by the US increased unprecedentedly
(interview with a former MOFA official on 15 July 2012).
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During the first three years of the Clinton administration, the US–Japan
security agenda had been allowed to ‘drift’ (Deming 2004: 62; Funabashi
1997). Although the publication of the Nye–Vogel Initiative of 1995 and the
signing of the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st
Century formally finished the ‘drift’ of the US–Japan alliance, bilateral rela-
tions remained fragile. The US continued to criticize Japan for its incompe-
tence to reform and recover itself from the aftershocks of the collapse of the
bubble economy. AsMorton I. Abramowitz described it: ‘The US pressures
and incessant lecturing, particularly from the administration, have been al-
most an integral part of the Japan–US relationship’ (Abramowitz 2002: 41).
Meanwhile, the unprecedented rapprochement between Beijing andWash-
ington made Japan worry about exclusion. Indeed, China and the United
States announced the establishment of a ‘constructive strategic partnership’
when President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to the United States in Octo-
ber 1997. In his state visit to China in June 1998, President Clinton praised
China’s contributions to easing the Asian economic crisis, and made the fa-
mous ‘Three nos’ (the US would not support Taiwan’s independence, its
admission to the United Nations, or the creation of two Chinas) commit-
ment on the Taiwan issue (Mann 2000: 36).
In Japan, it became a widely shared view that the Clinton administra-
tion paid little attention to Japan and too much to China (Abramowitz
2002: 47). Japan felt ‘deeply uneasy about the ‘constructive strategic part-
nership’ between the United States and China’ (Funabashi 1998: 32). The
sense of marginalization further deepened when Clinton failed to stop over
in Japan either before or after a nine-day tour in China in 1998 (inter-
view on 15 July 2012). Coincidentally, the US–China re-engagement almost
overlapped the proceedings of the Asian economic crisis. President Clin-
ton even directly criticized Japan’s initial inactiveness in dealing with the
East Asian economic crisis during his high-profile state visit to China (Cur-
tis 2004: 191). China was described as ‘a regional stabilizer’ and Japan as
‘a passive bystander’ in the early period of the crisis (Funabashi 1998: 32).
Akihiko Tanaka wrote that: ‘The age of “Japan bashing” had, it was felt,
been replaced first by that of “Japan passing”, and now by “Japan noth-
ing”‘ (Tanaka 2007: 63). Japan’s fear of abandonment by the US reached
its peak in this period and it was highly alert to the rapid development of
US–China relations, which was considered to be possibly at the expense of
Japan (interview on 15 July 2012). For the first time, Japan expressed ‘se-
rious doubts [about] the implications of US–China policy for US relations
with Japan’ (Curtis 2004: 191).
For the Japanese strategists, the top priority was to discourage the US
from abandoning Japan. They thought that Japan should raise its relevance
to the US rather than simply ‘get its policies in line with the United States’
(Curtis 2004: 191). The East Asian economic crisis and the trajectory of East
Asian regionalism provided Japan with a golden opportunity to break the
diplomatic predicament and to attract the attention of Washington.
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First, Japan tried to regain its reputation of economic relevance and re-
gional leadership through a proactive approach, involving substantial com-
mitments toward regionalism. At the very beginning of the Asian economic
crisis, the JapaneseMinistry of Finance (MOF) suggested the establishment
of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). However, the proposal was aborted
because of opposition from the US and China (Sakakibara 2000: 182–190).
In the following year, Japan failed to contribute substantially to easing
the crisis. Soon after taking office as premier in July 1998, Keizo Obuchi
found the value of regionalism for the purpose of enhancing relations with
Washington. Economically, at the second informal ASEAN+3 Summit in
Hanoi in December 1998, Japan surprised the world with the announce-
ment of the New Miyazawa Initiative (to differentiate the plan from the
one concerning the financial bailout of Mexico in the 1980s that also bore
his name), which became the basis of the Chiang Mai Initiative in May
2000. Japan generously committed to the provision of $30 billion–$15 bil-
lion in short-term financial support and an additional $15 billion in medium-
to long-term financing (Lincoln 2004: 217). Obuchi showed Japan’s
ability to play an important role in the region even under conditions of eco-
nomic distress (Tanaka 2007: 63). In 2000, premier Mori firstly announced
a US$15 billion aid package to bridge the digital divide in Asia. Politi-
cally, at the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit, Obuchi succeeded to launch the
China–Japan–Korea Summit for the first time. Ideologically, Japan pro-
moted the regional discussion of ‘human security’, which was thought to
be Japan’s possible ideological linchpin in its twenty-first century diplo-
macy. Tokyo’s signal was very clear that in the trilateral relations ‘Japan
is a player, not a spectator’ (Abramowitz 2002: 47).
Second, Japan purposely put some ‘anti-America’ tints in its policy to-
ward regionalism in this period, in the hopes to raise concerns in the US
about a Japan that was starting to lean more towards Asia. Economi-
cally, Japan’s New Miyazawa Initiative was done mostly ‘unilaterally what
it had intended to the AMF to do’ (Lincoln 2004: 217) rather than the
result of consultation with the US. Japan’s clear refusal against the US
proposal to make the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) be
a more aggressive liberalization mechanism at the 1998 Kuala Lumpur
Summit showed Japan’s determination to stand with its Asian neighbors
and side with ‘Asian consensus approach’ (Togo 2007: 97; Rapkin 2001:
381–394). Politically, Japan’s activism to institutionalize a triad mechanism
with China and South Korea raised expectations of a more multilateral-
oriented Japanese policy. Intellectually, Japan’s human security concept
was explicitly different from the concept of humanitarian intervention ex-
pressed by the NATO’s New Security Concept in 1999. The US faced a
soft challenge from Japan, which was distancing itself from the US. This
also partly led to the reassessment of Japan’s value to the US in the early
2000s.
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Third, Japan’s proactive ‘anti-America’ policy and diplomacy toward
regionalism were cautiously designed and deliberately implemented to not
really anger the US. The unilateral New Miyazawa Initiative was of consid-
erably smaller scale compared to the AMF idea. That the New Miyazawa
Initiative was firstly floated at a G7 finance ministers’ meeting in Wash-
ington rather than in any East Asian related meeting also demonstrated
Japan’s desire to show its relevance to the US. Similarly, Premier Mori
firstly announced the US$15 aid package for Asia on the occasion of the
Okinawa G8 summit.
On the other hand, Sino–Japan relations experienced downward devel-
opments. The redefinition of the Japan–US alliance, in particular the so-
called ‘Shyuhen Yuji’ (emergency in the surrounding area), made China sus-
picious of Japan’s intentions. President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998
was not successful due to obvious differences on historical issues. According
to a questionnaire conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1999, only 17% of
Chinese interviewees answered ‘satisfactory’ on the state of Sino–Japan re-
lations (in 1998, the ratio was 51%) and only 33% answered ‘satisfactory’ on
the state of Sino–Japan relations (in 1998, the ratio was 55%). Fifty per cent
of Chinese respondents expressed dislike toward Japan and 46% Japanese
interviewees expressed dislike toward China (Jin 2008: 211). Using region-
alism to further engage China emerged as a new policy choice for Japan
(interview on 2 July 2006), as Japan was a superpower in economic pres-
ence in East Asia and China was still a relatively isolated country struggling
for entering the WTO. In 2000, Japan’s GDP was almost four times of that
of China (World Bank) and Japan had legitimate reasons to be confident in
its absolute economic presence in Asia.
This period (1997–2000) witnessed Japan’s increasing interest in, fresh
ideas and strong commitments toward East Asian regionalism. Evading
abandonment by the US was the primary rationale behind its calculation
while it also began to think of engaging China via regionalism. Even though
Japan’s enthusiasm toward regionalism was tactically driven, it did provide
‘a golden path for reentering Asia through regionalism and even regaining
national identity’ (Togo 2007: 97). Unfortunately, successive Japanese
administrations missed the opportunity to make this tactical approach a
strategic shift and even squandered Asian diplomatic assets in the following
years.
The East Asian community boom and alliance enhancement
2001–2006
Between 2001 and 2006 (a period coinciding with the charismatic Junichiro
Koizumi’s premiership), the trilateral relations among China, Japan and the
United States were characterized by three dynamics: increasingly intimate
Japan–US relations; stable Sino–US relations; and increasingly deteriorat-
ing Sino–Japan relations.
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When Junichiro Koizumi took office as prime minister in 2001, the af-
tershocks of the Clinton administration still impacted the Japanese atti-
tude toward the future of US–Japan relations. At the same time, Japan’s
economic stagnation in contrast to China’s rapid rise, unsettled Japan’s
national identity as an economic giant. A national identity of confusion
and an uncertain feeling toward the future of the alliance with the US
engendered a more resentful nationalism in Japan. The Japanese pub-
lic began to be ‘much more supportive of tough, hawkish, assertive,
and occasionally confrontational posture in the conduct of foreign pol-
icy’ (Kawashima 2003: 3). As a prime minister without conventional fac-
tional support in the LDP, Koizumi showed his decisiveness to minimize
its external strategic calculation by firmly adopting an explicit diplomatic
tendency of ‘one track mind diplomacy of attaching Japan–US relations
with special importance’ (Iokibe 2007: 210). Locking in the US–Japan al-
liance remained a top priority for Tokyo in order to focus on domes-
tic reform and containing nationalism by siding with the US without
reservation.
Sino–US relations during this period were largely stable and improved.
In early 2001, President Bush described China as a ‘strategic rival’ and
the collision of military planes around Hainan Island strained bilateral
relations. However, the US rapidly improved its relations with China
after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In September 2005, then Deputy
Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on China to act as ‘a respon-
sible stakeholder’ in global affairs, a position which gradually became a
consensus in the Bush administration (Zoellick 2005; Hills and Blair 2007:
9). In 2006, the Strategic Economic Dialogue was initiated between China
and the United States.
Japan’s policy and diplomacy toward East Asian regionalism in this pe-
riod could be further divided into two sub-periods. The characteristic of
the first sub-period (2001–2004) involved more rhetoric than concrete com-
mitments, while the second sub-period (2005–2006) showed ever decreas-
ing both in rhetoric and substance. Koizumi’s diplomacy in Asia was not
dissimilar to his domestic politics, which were dubbed as ‘theater politics’
by some scholars (Otake 2003). Japan’s most striking contribution to re-
gionalism – the proposal for an East Asian Community – was introduced
by Koizumi in early 2002 in Singapore. (Koizumi 2002: 11–13) The pub-
licity effects contributed to the domestic boom of the discussion of East
Asian Community (Yoshino 2006: 5). One symbol of this boom was the
establishment of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) in May
2004. The CEAC consisted of 11 Japanese think tanks with the aim of pro-
viding intellectual support for Japan’s East Asian regional strategy. The
former premier Yasuhiro Nakasone served as the president and many in-
fluential figures in political, economic and academic circles were members
(the Council on East Asian Community 2004). In addition, numerous pub-
lications on East Asian regionalism were issued and countless seminars on
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this topic were held. However, Japan failed to translate its high-profile slo-
gans into concrete commitments.
The basic logic was to enhance the alliance with the United States by us-
ing regionalism as a policy tool. The fear of abandonment by the United
States had increased ever since and the Koizumi government basically
viewed East Asia regionalism as a useful tool to cooperate with the US
global strategy for increasing Japan’s relevance and continue to attract US
attention. Meanwhile, Japan’s confidence toward its influence in East Asia
vis-a`-vis China led to different attitudes toward regionalism in the two sub-
periods.
Japan’s reactions toward US coldness during the Clinton administration
had drawn attention from Washington, as reflected in the Armitage–Nye
Report (INSS Special Report 2000). However, American reassessment of
Japan’s importance was just a positive start rather than guaranteed pol-
icy shift. The transformation of American troops in Japan made Japanese
decision-makers worry about the large-scale military withdrawal from
Japan (Sunohara 2007). Former vice defense minister Moriya expressed
his deep concern of US inward-oriented shifting after the September 11
(Moriya 2010: 22). Since the end of the twentieth century, America has be-
gun to consider making major adjustments to its global military presence
in response to the aforementioned challenges and changes. In September
2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report stressed the shift of the ba-
sis of defense planning from a ‘threat-based’ model to a ‘capabilities-based’
model for the future (Department of Defense 2001: iv). The goals of US
military transformation were overseas military presence reduction includ-
ing in Japan. Facing with uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula and a ris-
ing China, American military transformation had intensified Tokyo’s fear
of abandonment (Takeda and Muto 2012: 35). Tokyo knew that without
enough incentives, the US interest in Japan would gradually wane and the
US–Japan alliance would be irrelevant. Put simply, Japan’s fear of aban-
donment remained strong in the minds of Japanese leaders. Two professors
of Japan’s Nation Defense Academy admit clearly Japan chose to be firmly
sided with the United States ‘to lessen the risk of abandonment by ignor-
ing the risk of entrapment’ (Takeda and Muto 2012: 36) during 2001–2006.
The US anti-terrorism war provided Japan a critical opportunity to show its
relevance and loyalty to the alliance directly. Bilaterally, Japan made sub-
stantial and unprecedented commitments both inAfghanistan and Iraq. Re-
gionally, policy and diplomacy toward regionalism were responsively mobi-
lized as a tool to realize the alliance strengthening.
Koizumi swiftly shifted Japan’s previous ‘anti-America’ colored ap-
proach toward regionalism to the direction of more accommodation and
coordination with US global strategy. Meanwhile, Japan deliberately prac-
ticed a balancing act between maintaining independence for diplomacy
while not inviting severe American suspicions of its overtures toward
regionalism.
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Politically, Japan played a proactive role in East Asia in organizing a
united front of anti-terrorism through its diplomacy toward regionalism.
After the 9/11 attacks, Koizumi asked his Chinese and Korean counterparts
to stand with the US against terrorism during his lightening visits to the two
neighbors in October 2001. On the occasion of the ASEAN+3 Summit in
2001, Japan actively tried to include an anti-terrorism item in the final chair-
man statement although ASEAN refused Japan’s proposal with the excuse
of having the same item in the ASEAN Summit chairman statement (Nihon
Keizai Shimbun 2001). The ASEAN–Japan Special Summit in December
2003 proved to be a timely occasion for Koizumi to explain his decision of
dispatching the Self Defense Force (SDF) to Iraq especially for obtaining
understanding of the biggest Muslim country, Indonesia who co-chaired the
Summit with Japan (Japan and Indonesia 2003). In November 2004, Japan
succeeded in issuing a joint statement of anti-terrorism with ASEAN at the
Vientiane Summit (Iijima 2007). At the same time, Koizumi’s high-profile
proposal for an East Asia Community (Koizumi 2002: 5) did not include
the US provided the US with incentive to keep thinking about Japan’s pos-
sible intentions and options which could lead to a consistent US attention
to Japan. In the composition of the membership of the East Asia Summit
(EAS) in 2005, Japan had kept ambiguity on the American participation,
which contrasted with its strong support of Australia and New Zealand’s
joining (Samuels 2007: 166). In the same vein, Koizumi’s unilateral stance
on Japan’s North Korea diplomacy also sent signal to the United States
that ‘Japan should not be taken for granted’ (Hughes and Krauss 2007).
Meanwhile, Japan refrained from making substantial commitments toward
regionalism for mitigating US over-concern and misperception of Tokyo
including its hesitation in the accession into the Treaty of Amity and Coop-
eration (Taniguchi 2004).
Economically, Japan refused to reform its highly protected agriculture
sector. Japan did not sign a comprehensive economic agreement with
ASEAN until 2008 without any substantial concession on its agriculture
sector, which contrasted strongly with the China–ASEANpact six years ago
with substantial Chinese compromises of the Early Harvest program. Japan
did not substantively upgrade its commitments toward the Chiang Mai Ini-
tiative (Hamilton-Hart 2007). Thus China had been positively considered
by ASEAN countries.as a power with ‘a clearer vision’ of its relations with
Asia (Yeo 2006) than Japan. The US had reasons not over-concern that
Japan might ‘go regional’ (Inoguchi 2002: 7).
Ideologically, Japan practically abandoned its one-time high-profile hu-
man security diplomacy for the intellectual foundation of the regionalism.
Japan began to shift its focus on regionalism to a more ‘value-based com-
munity’ (Sohn 2010: 498) in which universal values were highlighted and
more in line with the standard US rhetoric. Japan tried hardest and finally
successfully inserted the item of ‘common vision and values’ in the Tokyo
Declaration of ASEAN–Japan Special Summit, including respect for the
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rule of law and justice, pursuit of openness, promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people (Sudo, 2005). This
was the first time that ASEAN inserted these words into its documents with
an outside power (Zhang 2009: 186).
Despite less substantive commitments toward regionalism, Japan re-
mained highly interested in regionalism in the first sub-period because
Japan was still confident that it had more influence in Asia than that of
China. Many Japanese elites still thought of engaging China through re-
gionalism (Takahara 2003; The Council on East Asian Community 2004).
On the contrary, China’s ever growing presence in East Asia and ag-
gressive Asian diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007; Economy 2005) made Japan
feel less confident about engaging China through regionalism in the sec-
ond sub-period (interview on 15 June 2012). In 2005, Japan’s GDP global
share became 10.2% and that of China jumped to 5.0%. However, the fig-
ures were 14.9% for Japan and 3.8% for China respectively in 2000 (Arai
2007: 87). According to Fumio Yoshino, ‘East Asian community build-
ing is not beneficial to Japan at all but even harmful to Japan.’ (Yoshino
2006: 218). Furthermore, the deteriorating Sino–Japan relations discour-
aged the Japanese enthusiasts’ dreams of regionalism. The Koizmu ad-
ministration’s ‘near-total neglect of Sino–Japanese relations’ (Hughes 2009:
842) dramatically soured Sino–Japan relations. The ‘common strategic
objectives’ of the Japan–US alliance were formulated in a Joint State-
ment of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee in February 2005,
which clearly ‘encourage[d] the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the
Taiwan Strait through dialogue and ‘encourage China to improve trans-
parency of its military affairs’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005).
In the past, Japan’s bilateral statements with the US had never referred
to Taiwan and China directly. This was the first time that Japan joined
the United States in voicing public concern over Taiwan. It represented
a departure from the most recent previous military cooperation statement
between the United States and Japan in 1997, which simply called for the
two countries to work together in the ‘area surrounding Japan’ (The New
York Times 2005). Beijing saw the joint statement as an ‘unprecedented in-
stance’ of outside meddling in the issue of Taiwan. The National People’s
Congress of China responded by passing the Anti-Secession Law, which
aimed to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence. Together with his-
toric problems, Sino–Japan relations dropped to their lowest point in 2005
after the normalization of their diplomatic ties in 1972. But a relatively
amicable – or at least not confrontational – Sino–Japan relationship had
been widely regarded as the linchpin of many prospective and meaningful
regional projects (Kokubun 2007).
The decline of regionalism 2006–2009
During this period, Japan’s relations with the United States experienced a
‘quiet ongoing crisis’ (Calder 2009: 1). Japan’s capricious attitude toward
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the refueling mission discounted its commitment to the US anti-terrorism
war (The New York Times 2007, 2008). This was partly because of the po-
litical deadlock in Japan, but also stemmed from Japan’s decreasing inter-
est and necessity in serving the American global strategy. Japan and the
United States were also divergent on the budget of the Host Nation Sup-
port (HNS). The relocation of American bases in Okinawa failed to yield
substantial progress. The US–Japan Security Consultative Committee had
not held meetings for almost three years (the last taking place in 2007). If
not a new drift period, Japan–US relations was past its heyday under the
Koizumi administration.
On the contrary, Sino–US relations continued on as mostly stable, this
helped by the institutionalization of bilateral ties. In December 2006, the
first China–US Strategic Economic Dialogue was held. This was the first
high-ranking institutionalized channel between China and the US to ad-
dress major issues, although both had agreed to establish the constructive
strategic relationship in 1997. The framework was inherited by the Obama
administration and further upgraded to cover political, security and eco-
nomic fields in a global context of debating the Group 2 concept.
Facing the warming of Sino–US relations and relatively stagnant
Japan–US relations, Japan had reason to recall the nightmare of a possi-
ble Sino–US alignment. And if this were Japan’s reaction, Japan should
have used regionalism as a tool to call American attention and then en-
hance its commitments to the alliance, just as it did in the first and second
periods. But, neither happened. Japan’s policy and diplomacy toward re-
gionalism kept waning not only in its commitments, but also its policy ar-
ticulation and even public interest. The commitment to regionalism was in-
consistent and insubstantial. Economically, Many of Japan’s commitments
made on regional occasions were actually overlapping with Japan’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) programs rather than new initiatives. Po-
litically, the concept of an East Asia community quietly disappeared in the
policy speeches of Japanese leaders. Premier Shinzo Abe emphasized ‘the
Japan–US alliance for Asia and the world’ with the view of ‘widening the
free society inAsia’ (Abe 2006a). Premier Yasuo Fukuda raised the concept
of the ‘synergy of Japan–US alliance and Asian diplomacy’ with a focus on
bilateral relations with China and Korea in his Asian diplomacy. Premier
Taro Aso failed to articulate his regional ideas (Aso 2008a). Ideologically,
the human security concept was replaced by more nationalist articulation
(Abe 2006b) or more value-based diplomatic narration (Aso 2008b; Green
and Twining 2008). At the same time, public enthusiasm also waned in this
period (Amako 2009). Even more surprisingly, this period witnessed the
reversal of the debate. Further arguments tended to emphasize the dangers
of East Asian regionalism. Toshio Watanabe, a previously leading advo-
cate for Asian integration, argued in his book that ‘East Asian community
building is very dangerous for Japan because it would be a tool of Chinese
regional hegemony’ (Watanabe 2008). These arguments came in stark con-
trast with those of some years ago.
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One explanation for the above puzzle is that Japan had less fear of aban-
donment by the United States than a decade previously, and felt less of an
incentive to revive its regional efforts to lock in the strategic partnership
with the United States. Japan was more willing to maintain the status quo
andMimamori (watch carefully) developments.
First, Japan saw the Sino–US engagement in this period as a no-
alternative choice for America rather than as a proactive option by the US.
Economically, as the third biggest economy in the world, China had dra-
matically deepened its interdependence with the US in this period. Ameri-
can economic power had been relatively declining, especially after the eco-
nomic crisis. Even before the global recession, one of the Plaza Accord
leading architects Tomomitsu Oba hinted that the new era of ‘weak dol-
lar and weak America’ was coming (Oba 2008: 42) and warned that, ‘it [is]
time to think [of] Japan’s security policy in an era of weak America’ (Oba
2008: 49). Politically, as a member of the Security Council in the United
Nations, China is important for the US to address thorny problems such
as Iran and North Korea. As the biggest developing country in the world,
China plays a key role in achieving international consensus on global is-
sues such as global warming and energy. A decade ago, the United States
enjoyed absolute advantage over China and its nearing with China was an
autonomous option under America’s ample control. In stark contrast, the
more recent nearing of US–Sino relations is occurring because the US has
no alternative choice. Former administrative vice foreign minister Syotaro
Yachi argues that ‘doubtless that the United States is paying more attention
to China than Japan because China is experiencing unprecedented develop-
ment and the US has both hopes and anxiousness toward China’ (Yachi and
Takahash 2009: 111). Yachi argues that Japan should not be ‘over-nervous
which would lead to being thrown into confusion’ (Yachi and Takahash
2009: 112).
Second, as to the warming relations of China and the US in this period,
Japan began to view it as a strategic coexistence with characteristic of ‘sleep-
ing on the same bed, but having different dreams’ (Soeya 2005a: 100). As
such, it would not be at the expense of Japan. Both realists and liberals in
Japan share the perception that China and the United States relations are
mostly strategically competitive. The only difference between them is the
extent of that competiveness. Realists see China as a rival or even an en-
emy to the United States but Japan as a partner (Chuo Koron 2009: 37),
but liberals thinks less confrontationally (Soeya 2005a: 99). Both of them
acknowledge that Japan still matters to the United States (Soeya 2005a:
112; Chuo Koron 2009: 37).
Both realists and liberalists recognize the positive meanings of the near-
ing of China and the United States for Japan. Realist argues that the United
States will need allies to accommodate a rapid rising China and Japan’s
strategic value would increase in the process. Okazaki, a relatively hawk-
ish former diplomat and strategist, argues that ‘the more China becomes
stronger, the more America needs Japan. There is totally no problem of
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the US paying more attention to China’ (Chuo Koron 2009: 37). Liberal
strategists argue that increasing strategic communication and coordination
between the US and China would be helpful to stabilize international order
and peace. Soeya, a liberal strategist at Keio University, points out that:
It is meaningless to base Japan’s strategy on the perception of that the
stable Sino–US relations would be at the expense of Japan’s interests.
The stability of Sino–US relations should be welcomed by Japan and
more importantly the strategic relationship between them is beyond
Japan’s control. (Soeya 2005a: 112)
Third, in terms of the content of Sino–US nearing, Japan believes that
the US is facing a great challenge in managing divergence with China in the
process of seeking strategic coexistence. In this context, Japan is comfort-
ably positioned to refrain from choosing sides.
Besides political and security divergence, the economic divergence be-
tween China and the United States has become increasingly obvious.
Japan’s economic and currency friction with the United States has given
way to China. It would be much more difficult for the United States to han-
dle its divergence with China than with Japan, for in the past Japan always
took its position of subordination into account (Tanaka 2008: 37–38). Japan
has reasons to watch the process cautiously rather than hastily meddling.
In face of China’s rise, Japan knows that the United States is more front-
positioned to address China’s rise.
Japan has viewed the warming of Sino–US relations in the second part of
2000s differently than a decade ago. It feels less fear of possible abandon-
ment by the US. Furthermore, Japan is in a strong position to negotiate the
terms of the alliance, rather than simply capitulating to the United States.
Japan would be more willing to strengthen its negotiating position in the
alliance by using its leverage of Japan–China relations rather than regional-
ism. This mentality remained even after theDemocratic Party of Japan took
office in September 2009. Then Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa brought a
100 more Diet-member delegation to China in the late of 2009 to the sur-
prise of the United States.
At the same time, the ever-growing Chinese economic centrality in East
Asia is a worry to Japan, particularly in terms of the potential domi-
nant role of China in East Asia regionalism. In response, Japan began to
clearly welcome the United States and Russia at the East Asia Summit
around 2006–2007 (Nakasone 2006), as part of a strategy of diluting China’s
ever-growing presence in the region (interview on 15 July 2012). Japanese
academia began to enthusiastically discuss the role of the US in East Asia
(Cossa and Takana 2007; The Council on East Asian Community 2007), es-
pecially in the face of the coldness of the Bush administration’s Asian diplo-
macy (Goh 2004; Limaye 2007; Cossa and Takana 2007: 144–174). Yachi
also admitted his strong interest in bringing the US to the East Asia Sum-
mit during his tenure as administrative vice foreign minister (Yachi and
Takahashi 2009).
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Conclusion
Three conclusions can be drawn from the previous analysis. First, the fear
of possible abandonment by the United States serves as the primary vari-
able in influencing Japan’s attitudes toward East Asian regionalism. When
Japan feels the threat of abandonment by the US, it shows an enthusiasm
toward regionalism, as reflected in the first and second periods. When Japan
feels abandonment more directly, it tends to make substantial commitments
toward regionalism as it did in the first period. When it feels abandonment
less urgently, it tends to react more rhetorically toward regionalism. In the
third period, Japan’s enthusiasm toward regionalism declined substantially
in line with its decreasing fear of abandonment.
Second, fear of abandonment is closely connected to Japan’s perception
of China–US relations. Both the first and third periods witnessed a warming
in China–US relations, but Japan responded differently to each. That means
that close China–US relations do not necessarily lead to a fear of aban-
donment on Japan’s part. When Japan feels the US tilts more proactively
toward China, possibly at the expense of Japan, it feels threatened and
responds actively and substantially toward regionalism. Otherwise, Japan
seems to have less incentive to do so. The way in which Japan perceives
China–US relations also tends to influence Japan’s diplomacy at large.
Third, Japan’s perception of its regional influence vis-a`-vis China affects
its attitude toward regionalism. When Japan is more confident in its re-
gional presence than China, it shows more interest in regionalism; when
it is less confident, it views East Asia regionalism as a policy tool of Chinese
dominance.
The analysis thus challenges the conventional assertion that Japan is
balancing China through regionalism or is engaged in a regional power
struggle. If Japan really intended to balance China and to gain primacy
through regionalism, it should have taken a more proactive approach rather
than passively following China’s path. Japan’s ‘comprehensive arrange-
ments’ are more lip-service but its real steps are ‘small and tentative’
(Samuels 2007: 166). Koizumi’s ‘near-total neglect of Sino–Japanese re-
lations’ (Hughes 2009: 842) made his East Asian Community idea least
persuasive because without the stable relationship between the two giants,
the regionalism would achieve nothing. In 2005, Japan even dared to sac-
rifice the China–Japan–Korea tripartite summit which was established by
Obuchi’s initiative. Ideologically, Japan replaced its promotion of a more
advantageous human security theory with the value-based thinking in its
dealings with regionalism. Unfortunately during the last decade, Japan al-
most proactively squandered its assets in its Asian diplomacy. The explana-
tion is that the strategic priority of Japan is not on Asia but still on alliance
management.
In summary, Japan has failed to formulate a new framework to address
new challenges in the post Cold War era and largely sticks to the old
alliance management approach. Tokyo’s policy toward East Asian
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regionalism is largely defensive. The comprehensive design of Japan’s pol-
icy toward Asia and China in particular is far from emerging. This also
partly explains its fluctuating relations with China and Asia after the Cold
War. Even if Japan feels less abandonment by the US now, it will always
suspect the lack of resolve of America in its dealings with neighboring coun-
tries and China in particular. Japan might periodically test the resolve of the
US, which might further alienate its neighbors. (The recent China–Japan
spat on the sea might be a case in point.) Without comprehensive strategy
in balancing alliance and Asia diplomacy, Tokyo seems to be falling into a
new dilemma between periodically testing alliance effectiveness and occa-
sionally exacerbating, or ignoring, neighborhood relations.
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